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Abstract: The cloud control systems (CCs) are inseparable parts of industry 4.0.
The cloud, by providing storage and computing resources, allows the controllers
to evaluate complex problems that are too computationally demanding to perform
locally. However, connecting physical systems to the cloud through the network can
provide an entry point for attackers to infiltrate the system and cause damage with
potentially catastrophic consequences. Hence, in this paper, we present a demo of
our proposed security framework for CCs and demonstrate how it can detect attacks
on this system quickly and mitigate them.
Keywords: Cloud control systems, Intrusion detection, Attack mitigation, Test-bed,
Cyber security
1 Introduction
By adoption of new technologies, we have had several revolutions in industry and now some
modern technologies like IoT, cloud computing, etc are paving the way for smart factory that
will realise industry 4.0. Industrial control systems (ICs) as part of industry 4.0 are becoming
more efficient and smarter. However, these systems are also becoming more and more connected
and part of a network systems and this communication link between different components of ICs
can provide an access point for attackers to intrude into the system and manipulate the signals that
are sent through the network. For example, the attacker by manipulating measurement signals
can deceive the controller to generate a wrong control signal that can make our system unstable
and lead to catastrophic consequences like what we had in recent years. In recent years, we have
had several attacks in different parts of industry that demonstrate ICs are still prone to cyber
attacks and highlight the necessity for an appropriate security measure to protect these systems.
The cloud provides seemingly endless computing and storage resources that can be used to
execute more advanced control strategies in ICs. However, in cloud control systems (CCs), there
is a network between the plant and the cloud that the measurement and control signals are sent
through this network and this can make these systems vulnerable to cyber attacks.
In this paper, we present a demo of our proposed security framework that is applied on CCs
and include intrusion detection and mitigation. In this system, we have a ball and beam process
as our plant, a Kubernetes (K8S)-cluster that hosts an intrusion detection and the main controller,
and a local controller that is part of our mitigation method and implemented using Python code
beside the plant.
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(a) Security framework overview. (b) Test-bed overview.
Figure 1: An overview of the demo system.
2 Secure cloud control systems demo
In this section, we present our demo and explain how different parts of the test-bed are imple-
mented. Figure 1 shows an overview of our demo system. Figure 1a shows our proposed security
framework, and Figure 1b shows the test-bed implementation. The system’s components are de-
tailed below.
2.1 Plant
We use a ball and beam process as our plant. The ball and beam system consists of a long beam
which can be tilted by an electric motor together with a ball rolling back and forth on top of the
beam. This system is open-loop unstable and without a controller, it will swing to one side or
the other, and the ball will fall off the end of the beam. Our motivation for choosing the ball and
beam system is that it is an intrinsically unstable and time-critical system such that any attack
on this system can make it unstable quickly. So, evaluating our proposed security framework on
this system can prove its effectiveness.
2.2 Kubernetes cluster
The test-bed has been equipped with a six-node Kubernetes cluster as the edge cloud. Kubernetes
(K8S) 1 is a portable, extensible, open-source platform for managing containerized workloads
and services, that facilitates both declarative configuration and automation . The cluster has been
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using the K8S NodePort paradigm. We use this K8S cluster to implement our main controller
and intrusion detection algorithm.
2.3 Main controller
To stabilize the ball, we need a feedback controller that uses measurement signals to adjust
the beam accordingly. A Model Predictive Control (MPC)-based controller is designed based
on [STÅK20] as the main controller in Figure 1. This controller for execution needs some
computation resources that cloud can provide it. Thus, we deploy this controller using Python
and Container technology as a pod in the Kubernetes cluster.
2.4 Attack and intrusion detection
All communication between the plant and the cloud is over a Local Area Network (LAN) and
uses a protocol defined in Protocol Buffers (Protobuf) 4 which is realized in gRPC 5. Measure-
ment signals includes position of the ball, angle of the beam, and speed of the ball are sent
through this network to the main controller in the cloud. The main controller using these gener-
ates the control signal and send it back to the plant. This control signal by adjusting the beam’s
speed controls the position of the ball on the beam. We assume the attacker tries to manipulate
the measured position signal, and we implement the attack by adding a ramp signal with small
slope (between 0.001 to 0.05) to the position signal using python codes.
We deploy our proposed intrusion detection in [ATFK21] using python and container technol-
ogy as a pod in the Kubernetes cluster. This intrusion detection consists of two parts: residual
generator and decision system. Residual generator estimates the value of the measurement sig-
nal and then by comparing it with the real one generates a residual signal. In healthy condition
during which there is no attack, the residual signal is close to zero. Thus, the decision system
evaluates the residual signal and by comparing it with a certain threshold decides if there is any
attack in the system or not. If it detects any attack in the system, it will trigger an alarm signal.
2.5 Attack mitigation method and ancillary controller
Our objective for mitigation is to keep the plant stable under the attack with an acceptable per-
formance. As mitigation, we consider an ancillary controller that is placed close to the plant such
that there is no public network between the plant and this controller so there is no possibility for
the attacker to intrude into the system. Measurement signals from the plant are sent to both main
and local controller, but our priority is to use the control signal generated by the main controller
that is more advanced controller. Once the attack has been detected, and the alarm signal has
beet triggered, we will switch to the ancillary controller. Ancillary controller is implemented
as a Linear–quadratic regulator (LQR). We refer to [ATFK21] for a full detail of the mitigation
algorithm. LQR is a simpler controller than MPC and it requires little computational capacity,
allowing it to be implemented in the physical domain.
4 https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/
5 https://grpc.io/
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(a) Security framework overview. (b) Test-bed overview.
Figure 2: Results for ramp attack with slope=0.001.
3 Experiments
We design the attack based on section 2.4 and start applying it on the position signal at the
14500th sample. Figure 2 shows effects of this attack on the system in the presence and absence
of our security framework. As it is seen in Figure 2a, Our intrusion detection can detect this
attack really fast and based on this detection, our mitigation will be activated quickly. So, as
the blue line in Figure 2b shows, the attack tries to deviate the ball from its setpoint, but by
activating the mitigation part and switching to ancillary controller, we can move the ball back
to its setpoint. Otherwise, in the absence of mitigation method, as the red line shows, the attack
will move the ball to the end of the beam and finally cause the ball to fall off.
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